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A crisis of German unionism has often been postulated and an imminent
decline prophesied. Despite these interpretations, German unions are in fact
quite stable with respect to the percentage of German workers who are
unionized, and the total membership figure is still fairly high. In fact, the
percentage actually increased during the last 15 years. This holds true for the
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)--the union of the unions--in general and,
for the most part, for the Metal Workers' Union (IGM) in particular trend.
Yet, beneath the surface, there are other forces which will eventually influence
the situation.
This high degree of unionization reflects the ongoing effectiveness of the
recruiting programs of the German unions. The first step involves recruiting
the qualified industrial workers who readily join unions, followed by semi-skilled
and unskilled blue collar workers. Once successful on these levels, the unions
have bettered their chances to organize the white collar workers. This success
is partly due to the aura which dynamic unions project and partly due to closed
shop practices.
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However, I believe that the past approaches are gradually becoming
ineffective. I would like to stress that present and future structural changes in
industry are and will be detrimental to the union movement. On one hand, the
industries and occupations where the unions have been strongest are now
threatened by stagnation or even contraction. On the other hand, those
industries and occupations where the unions are traditionally weak are now
becoming much more important: those are the industries with skilled
professional white collar workers, e.g., the electonics industry, etc. The result
is that the union membership is not representative of today's workforce. The
structure of the memberships corresponds to that of the workforce of thirty
years ago.
These observations are nothing new and they certainly remind one of the
present situation in American unions. What is perhaps not self-evident and
what I am going to talk about is first, some peculiarities of the dynamics
underlying that change. The peculiarities that I am referring to relate to the
massive redistribution of quality of life caused by the industrial restructuring in
West Germany. We are beyond doubt justified in calling this redistribution a
zero-sum game. A vast gap is opening up within the working class itself as
opposed to the traditional separation betwen the working class and the
establishment. Several sociological terms have become common in German
politics: "coming of society of the two thirds," and the polarization between
"winners and losers in rationalization" refer to this gap but these epithets must
be supported with hard facts.
For the unions, the zero-sum situation represents an extremely disturbing
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potential: when in fact some can win everything and others can lose
everything, a new polarization of interests between employees arises. This is
disastrous for the unions because their traditional wage policies cannot
accommodate these diverse interests. However divided the working class may
have been in the past, the common goals of higher wages, greater leisure, more
job security were a strongly cohesive force. This is no longer the case. In
the view of today's winners, who get nearly everything they want, such
objectives are too tame. And for the losers, who actually need union support,
the union's current approach offers little or nothing. This is true because the
traditional union policy presupposes functioning employment of its members and
this is exactly what the losers are lacking. Therefore, the German unions are
doubly jeopardized because they are going to become irrelevant to both winners
and losers.
One side of that problem--the winner's side--I will discuss in the second
part of my paper. First, I will make some comments regarding the "zero-sum
situation." If one wants to understand the difficulties which German unions
presently have in organizing and representing the workforce, there are three
important areas to address:
1. Within the area of blue collar work--an area which admittedly is
becoming less important but to which 45% of the German workforce
belongs--a new type of skilled work, "skilled systems control," has taken
over with remarkable speed. This is a result of flexible automation and
innovative work/organization. People who become skilled systems
controllers are typical winners (see Chart 1). However, it must be
emphasized that this change is mainly restricted to high-technology areas.
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This is due largely to increased capital invested in technological equipment
and processes which necessitated a new workforce. In low-tech areas,
manual labor still prevails and in the automobile industry, this manual
labor is unskilled (see Charts 2 and 3).
Thus, especially in the automobile industry, one has to cope with a
further segmentation of the workforce: mechanical departments versus final
assembly and, in between, body assembly. More precisely, on the one
hand, in the high-tech areas of this industry and similar ones, a growing
minority of blue collar workers are going to win with respect to
qualifications and social status. On the other hand, there remain a
shrinking majority who are excluded from such advantages.
2. Within the area of white collar work--that is an area which, to be
sure, is becoming more important (now 45 of the German workforce,
excluding government employees)--an internal division may also be
observed. Winners in that field are: highly qualified R&D people, trained
technicians in services, engineering in manufacturing, professionals using
electronic data processing, etc., mainly in the electronic industry, aircraft
industry, machine tool industry, and similar technology-based industries.
These white collar workers are already in the majority. The increase of
white collar workers has been achieved mainly by the increase in these
categories. But the regrouping of white collar workers does not eliminate
all simple white collar tasks. These operations shrink considerably but
there remains some clerical work particularly in the mass production
industries. Unskilled white collar workers and laid-off traditional
professionals accumulate in these industries. These people do not have a
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chance to become winners. I cannot yet offer figures from personal
research in order to quantify these changes, but Chart 4 provides some
data from official statistics.
3. These processes coincide with high unemployment. In particular, the
proportion of jobless people who are long-term unemployed, is increasing--
"long term" meaning those who are registered as unemployed and who are
without occupation for more than one uninterrupted year. In West
Germany, there are 0.65 million long-term unemployed persons (32% of all
the unemployed). These figures reflect the economic expansion achieved
by the core sectors of the German economy. The expansion, however, was
not large enough to absorb many of the workers who have lost their jobs
in declining industries. Overall, the total demand for labor was
decreasing. Additionally, the economic expansion of core industries was
not great enough to employ the increased number of workers created by
changing demographic factors: increasing birth rates, shifts in the makeup
of the working population, including the addition of women to the
workforce. When discussing the long-term unemployment that exists in
West Germany, we also have to blame the personnel policies of the core
industries. They, for the most part, function totally independently of
labor trends in the rest of industry. They use their expansion mainly to
stabilize the employment in their own cadres and seldom hire from the
ranks of the unemployed. Only new workers with excellent qualifications
are recruited from the external labor market. Without government
intervention, which is now more effective in countering the crisis of the
labor market, joblessness and long-term unemployment will increase
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indefinitely.
To summarize briefly: within the employment system there will continue
to occur a differentiation of working conditions and opportunities in both
directions, upward and downward. It is exactly that process I have in mind
when using the term "zero-sum situation." When we look at the German labor
market, we can observe different groups of employees, each characterized by a
specific set of opportunities, experiences, and--correspondingly--political
dispositions. First, the winners: skilled production workers, maintenance
specialists, technicians, engineers in innovative production processes, research
and development personnel, sales and service specialists, systems experts, etc.
To give an idea of the size of this group: in the metal industry these winners
may now comprise a third of the workforce and may reach 50% by the year
2000. Second, all categories of traditional workers, the unskilled manual
laborers and machine feeders, the white collar workers in routine jobs, etc. If
members of this group still possess a job in the core of the economy, their jobs
are protected by wage agreements and their working conditions are defined by
collective bargaining. For that reason, they represent the middle. Third, are
the workers who are not considered candidates for any jobs in the new
workplaces and who are, in fact, if they are working, on the verge of being let
go, and those who never had a chance to enter the stable segment of the labor
market.
Given this structure, the main problem of the German unions is as follows:
Will the unions be able to prevent the winners from being politically neutralized
or even worse, absorbed by the social opponents of the unions? The unions
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should pay attnetion to this problem because the winners already form an
important reservoir of potential union membership which will grow in the
future. Last but not least, the winners can exert quite a bit of social and
political power because of their key position in the modern production process
and they are an example to others. If the unions are unable to reach this
group, they will no longer be able to transform functional importance in the
work process into leverage in the political process.
The key questions are, then:
(1) Do the German unions possess the capability to discourage the winners
from allying with traditional power elites, i.e., management, the high-
ranking staffs, etc.?
(2) Are they capable of preventing the new establishment from coming into
being, an establishment which includes the
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winners and is extremely powerful because it is in charge of the
production process?
(3) Are the unions capable of protecting other groups of employees, the losers
and the middle group, from being squeezed out by this establishment?
I will address some of these questions in more depth in the next part of
my paper. I primarily want to point out the political preferences and the
behavior of the winners with respect to the unions. This emphasis is justified
because of the fact that the behavior of these winners has become a crucial
point of union power in West Germany. For the sake of simplicity, I will avoid
discussing the internal differences among the winners. Interestingly enough,
the winners tend to see themselves as a unified entity, in spite of their actual
differences. They see themselves as being integrated into a collectivity, based
on their cooperative work and performance. To this collectivity belong the
skilled production workers as well as the maintenance specialists, the
technicians, engineers, technically qualified office workers, etc. The old status
symbols are fading away. To stress that the winners do have, in fact, a great
deal in common, I'll call them the "modern employees."
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I wish to make five basic points:
1. The "modern employees" are not at all "born" members of the
union movement. The old message which the German unions addressed to
workers is not effective in their case. It is impossible to mobilize the "modern
employees" on the basis of the concept that the interests of workers are
harmed through their subordination to capital and that the unions are the
champions of the oppressed. This does not mean that "modern employees" are
totally content either. As a matter of fact, many of their requests are not
met. However, management's past history of refusal to acknowledge basic
needs, which historically brought the worker into the labor movement, is no
longer a motivating issue. The "modern employees" possess sought-after,
desirable skills and need not be concerned about being lost in the sea of
workers looking for a job or basic needs. Instead of suffering from financially
restrictive circumstances, they earn good money. Instead of being ruled by
other persons who define work and effort, the norms no longer seem to be
personalized; they appear as obvious demands of the machinery and the social
systems; "modern employees" accept demands defined in that way. Finally,
instead of skills being unimportant as in Fordism, the modern work process
encourages employees to achieve and gain knowledge and skills. If modern
workers show interest in the areas of job security, money, effort, and skills
(i.e., in the traditional areas of collective bargaining in Germany), they do so in
a vague manner and in the abstract. "Stress could capture us early" or "Our
knowledge could quickly become obsolete" are typical concerns of "modern
employees." Yet it is also typical of their thinking to immediately state their
optimism in meeting these ch !enges individually by means of individual
bargaining, further educa+ job change, advancement, etc. Admittedly, to
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offer help for gaining such solutions may sound like a politically astute move
for unions, but the requests from these workers are so specialized that they are
not appropriate for a comprehensive union program. There is only one issue
which could be an exception: when it comes to money and other tangible
gratification, modern employees, to be sure, are not so concerned with the
actual sums but are very critical of a system of rewards which for them may
remain secretive. Modern employees passionately demand openness. They want
to "KNOW." They are disturbed by any power structure in factories and offices
which remains a mystery to them. This leads to my second point.
2. Modern employees want to be involved. The main fault they find
with work organizations is a participation gap: ponderous decision-making
processes, unclear criteria and evaluation of aims and means, no opportunity for
participation in strategic goal-fixing, arbitrary exclusion of alternatives worthy
of consideration, lack of opportunity for unconventional proposals. They see
themselves as knowledgeable managers whose knowledge is not adequately used,
despite their comprehensive working roles. They have been trained to be
independent and responsible but these qualifications are normally only expected
to be used in limited structured workplace situations. The workplace remains a
hierarchical environment.
The main complaint has been that when one offers ideas, they are not
seriously evaluated let alone, implemented. However, this gap has been
recognized by management, at least by the more open-minded parts of it. The
response has been an attempt to open lines of communication. These include
organization development, quality circles, simplified decision paths, etc. Yet
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real participation often fails because the traditionally privileged ranks fear
change and experiments and the power structure is too rigidly set up to change.
Thus, the desire for participation by "modern employees" has not been satisfied
as hoped.
For the unions, theoretically, the participation gap offers great opportunity
to mobilize the modern workers. Unions could try to create a distinctive
political image for themselves with the slogan that the arcane elements of the
power system should be abolished and effective democratic decision processes
guaranteed. Unfortunately, many of the union organizations have an internal
participation gap as great as those in business organizations.
But there is a snag in all this. "Let us have more democracy" is the right
slogan for "modern employees" only under the condition that the result is an
increase in individual participation. This means that it explicitly avoids new
mediations--"codetermination-bureaucracies." It implies involvement from the
bottom, therefore the effects of individual participation are primary. As a
result, the German unions are now returninf to the concept of co-determination
in the workplace which they have tended to ignore in the past. But today, the
unions need a more comprehensive and detailed model for bottom-up
participation if they really want to become attractive to "modern employees."
Frankly, instead of acting for the employees they must restrict themselves to
the role of political brokers. Unions must try to enlarge the avenues through
which the employees can independently realize their interests and at the same
time they must be there to aid those who, in doing so, find themselves in
conflict with management.
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Obviously, only those unions which have appropriate internal structures
can be credible advocates of the participation interests of "modern employees."
In this context "appropriate" means, flexible approaches, openness for
experiments, and member participation, instead of monolithic organizations
embodying the principles of "democratic centralism." This is exactly the
challenge the German unions must face. Their handling of the so-called
Lafontaine affair is proof of their present inability to cope with the problem.(1)
3. The "modern employees" are "knowledge workers." If they make
successful decisions, they do so by means of careful deliberation, intellectual
discipline, flexibility, and independent judgment. Workers who exhibit these
qualities became obsessed with the concept of rational decision making:
reasonable solutions are appreciated, others are scoffed at. To be sure,
technicians often interpret reason very narrowly as instrumental reason. In
that case, rationality turns into a rationalistic prejudice and becomes narrow-
minded with respect to political problems. But in our interviews we often
observe that many "modern employees" are well able to avoid such narrow-
mindedness.
So today we can find, for example, skilled chemical workers who use their
professional competence as a resource for a more general environmental
criticism and who, based on their knowledge, appreciate the possibility and
rationality of less hazardous production systems with fewer emissions producing
safer products. And today we can also mention the example of engineers who,
on the one hand design and manufacture labor-saving equipment, but who, on
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the other hand, see the single-mindedness in which industrial planning processes
frequently develop. They realize that these processes lag behind current
technical possibilities and also observe that the humanization potentialities
typical of modern technologies are often not taken advantage of. A final
example is that of industrial engineers who, as planning professionals, have
learned to think according to models which optimize a high number of relevant
varibles and who are accustomed to paying attention to undesired side effects
of planning. They are able to see that industrial production is often restricted
to a narrow ends-and-means test, calculated on the level of the individual
company and that this approach frequently causes immense social costs.
Consequently, these social costs have to be substracted from the profts of the
individual firm, with the result that the overall bakance may become negative.
These reflections can be viewed as considerations of "social" or "holistic
rationality." In these considerations we have to see more than the so-called
staff-and-line controversy of the old bureaucratic organization theory. This
theory assumes a fundamental opposition between the technical experts and
those
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having actual power, but in reality such a controversy does not always develop.
These ideas are not based exclusively on the "modern employees" working
role, but on their working role as "modern employees" but on their double role
as employees and as members of society. This dual identity enables them not
only to identify the deficiencies of the capitalist version of modern life, but
using their professional knoweldge and competence, they can also recognize the
deficiencies as unnecessary and as conquerable.
In my examples the skilled chemical worker, the work planner, and the
industrial engineer act as persons who may experience environmental destruction
when they walk through a devastated German forest after work. In another
example the designers and producers of machinery act as persons who also
experience unemployment privately in their family and neighborhood. Also
computer experts who see the consequences of primitive layouts of machines in
the learning deficiencies of their own children due to insufficient computers in
school. Through their professional training they all are well aware that these
happenings must not occur.
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Those who have come to the point of recognizing and analyzing these
divergent experiences and issues are open to the argument that rationality on
the level of the whole society is necessary (i.e., Max Weber's "material
rationality"). They will openly examine new solutions which avoid the known
shortcomings and will perhaps involve themselves in realizing them--even if it
does not affect them in their work or even if it requires some of their free
time. We should not underestimate the attractiveness that such reasonable
social interpretations have for pesons who become used to thinking holistically
in their everyday working life. Here once again developments bring not only
challenges but opportunities for the German unions.
It is not that the unions could rely blindly upon the rational elements of
the "modern employees'" conscience, but they may trust in the fact that slowly
an idea is becoming reality, an idea which Theo Pirker(2) emphasized thirty
years ago: that there can be a reversal in the representation of collective
identity within factories and offices. Employees can supplant managers as
the protagonists of the further historical progress.
Union policies must include, develop, represent, and strengthen this
mentality. It is quite possible to define a union policy which builds on these
opportunities. (3) But once again, I have to stress that the German unions are
hesitant to follow this route.
4. The process of political socialization has developed in another
way, compared with socialization in the old worker's movement. We can speak
straightforwardly about a turnaround of the typical life histories of active
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unionists. In former times, an employee entered the plant at the lowest level,
very early in his life, around age 14 and was shaped and politically educated by
his elder colleagues.
Today, many of the modern employees come out of the enlarged and more
independent educational system; they are much older and they often go directly
into relatively high positions. That is to say that employees tend to come from
the outside rather than advancing from within. Today the work tasks they
occupy are defined as strictly professional ones because the trade unions have
not yet incorporated these positions.
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In former times, the worker became a unionist early on and more or less
without choosing. This made him rather open for the political branches of the
labor movement. Contrarily, if a "modern employee" is unionized, he looks at
the world through another window: perhaps he became a strong unionist
because he previously had contact with left-wing politics, exposure through
education and friends, belonging to the 68-generation, having contacts with the
Social Democratic Party of Willy Brandt's times, or at present, being active in a
peace or a citizen's movement, in the Protestant church, or wherever. Only
based on such a background did it or would it make sense to him to become a
union activist as the complement to his political worldview.
The result of this is that for their attempts to mobilize modern employees
the unions are very much more dependent on a previous mobilization through
other issues and institutions. If they want to mobilize these groups more
intensively they have to be in closer contact with those social groups where
primary political socialization is happening today. In West Germany that means
the unions have to cooperate closely with the Social Democratic Party, perhaps
the Greens, the environmental and peace movements, the churches, or the
women's movement, etc. Seen from the side of the historical politicization
patterns, the unions must finally realize that they are no longer "the"
organization of the labor movement. However far back their tradition may
reach, and however strong their membership still is, more than before they have
to accept that they must fit into the camp of the political left. Instead of
continuously cutting themselves off from other organizations, they need to
politically protect themselves by forming allies. However, I have not observed
that the German unions have acknowledged that their power has become a
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function of the whole camp.
5. What is true for mobilizing new members evidently is also true
for collective bargaining. The success in collective bargaining depends on the
power relations between the opponents. In the past, these relations were
strongly influenced by the capacity unions had to strike effectively. In the
future, to be sure, to call a strike will remain an important instrument of
combat. But it will be even more complicated than before to apply this tactic.
To strike is fairly far from the minds of the "modern employees" and if they
should nevertheless strike, they would do it in a changed manner.
Their mental distance to striking results from their view of the strike as a
crude form of political pressure. Striking is not well adapted to the intellectual
and sophisticated habits preferred by this group. They are impressed by the
power of the spoken word and therefore they believe in the effectiveness of
their arguments. If in a bargaining process the union wants to mobilize the
modern employees, it has to offer good and precise reasons for its claims and
tactics. When these workers side with unions, they aid in the realization of
the union goals through propaganda. Verbal arguments advance take on
importance. Bargaining processes will have to take the shape of teach-ins and
become campaigns of revelation and instruction. The support of public opinion
will gain more and more importance. Only in such a context will the refusal to
work be called into play as an ultimatum. It will be performed with a gentle
hand rather than with a punch. Nevertheless, such strikes could be very
effective because of the fact that the modern employees can use their
resourceful, professional competence, transforming it into clever, creative,
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perhaps even inspiring restrictive practices.
Modern strikes are demonstrations and arguments to the public. If such
public pressures are not sufficient, more active interventions will occur, but
they will be applied subcutaneously. Only those trade unions which are able to
enlarge and develop their bargaining methods in these directions, i.e., which are
capable of using sophisticated pressure, will have a chance to transform
"modern employees"' power into political leverage. Yet, the German unions,
confused by their traditions, seem to have difficulties advancing along these
lines.
When I explain this theory to German union members and officials, and I
have had many such opportunities, the reactions are often ambivalent. The
"zero-sum argument" is mostly accepted. Yet, my comments with respect to the
political behavior of the "modern employees" often arouse critical reactions. To
my critics I answer that it is not necessary to accept all elements of my
argument. But no one should ignore the fact that the political integration of
the "modern employees" has become a central factor in union power in West
Germany. It is this result of changed industrialization which the unions have
to accept but to which they can adapt in different fashions. For those who do
not want to accept my solutions, they are then obliged to offer others. The
German unions can no longer sweep the problem of the "modern employees"
under the rug.
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FOOTNOTES
(1) Oskar Lafontaine, one of the deputy presidents of the Social Democratic
Party, offered some ideas on how to reduce the weekly working time in
order to absorb unemployed workers. Admittedly, Lafontaine's statements
were political manuevers, not well thought out, and improperly presented.
Lafontaine is obviously no expert on wage agreement policy. That was
problematical enough, but the reactions of the unions were perhaps even
more problematical. The unions countered immediately and defensively,
ignoring all differences of opinion within the unions with respect to the
policy of reduction of working time. Instead of using Lafontaine's remarks
as a contribution to a discussion which is still open, all discussion was cut
off.
(2) Theo Pirker published this idea in 1957 in "Arbeiter, Management,
Mitbestimmung" (Workers, Management, Co-determination), one of the
classics of German industrial sociology.
(3) I gave more details in a talk at national conference of the German Metal
Worker's Union in Frankfurt, September 21, 1988. See; Die Tarifbewegung
der Zukunft: Oeffentlich, Mitgliederbeteiligung und Kampfformen (The
Future of Collective Bargaining: Public, Members' Participation and
Bargaining Methods), in: IG Metal (ed.), Die andere Zunkunft: Solidaritaet
und Freiheit, Tarifpolitisches Forum, Koeln 1988: Bund Verlag
(forthcoming). Preprint: Frankfurter Rundschau 186/1988, p. 16.
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APPENDIX
The following charts sum up some preliminary results of a survey on the
development of work structures in selected industries. The research is being
conducted by Volker Baethge, Uwe Neumann, Michael Schumann, and Roland
Springer from our SOFI-Institute (Sociological Research Institute, University of
Goettingen). The findings are reported in Schumann et al. : Trendreport ueber
Rationalisierungskonzepte und verlaeufe (Trend Report on Concepts and Forms
of Rationalization). SOFI - working paper, Goettingen, April 29, 1988.
OD 10% of the respective workforce
0 up to 5%
The filled- part of the circles indicates the proportion of skiled workers in
the respective group.
©D These figures represent "pilot projects," i.e., departments whose
work-structures indicate the future development according to management
planning.
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The last chart uses official statistics.
Source: Statistiches Bundesamt, Fachserie 16: Arbeiter- und
Angestellv\tenverdienste in der Industrie.
The data is given in obsolete figures:
LG 2: 1970 - 264.000
LG 3: 1970 - 511.000
LG 4 & 5: 1970 - 358.000
1985 - 484.000
1985 - 508.000
1985 - 209.000
CHART 4: WHITE COLLAR WORK FORCE IN METAL INDUSTRY
(i.e. AUTOMOBILE, ELECTRONIC, STEEL, MACHINE ETC. INDUSTRY)
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